The water industry has been conducting vulnerability assessments of critical
water infrastructure. These assessments produce outputs that will prompt
some tough expenditure decisions. In an industry already faced with the
combined costs of increasingly stringent regulations, infrastructure
replacement, water shortages, and competitive pressures, how much is it
prudent to spend on long lists of increased security measures to combat
unknowable risks? Doubts about our safety have been raised and these
doubts need to be addressed. Yet, it is difficult to put such doubts to rest
when we cannot reliably quantify the risks. Regrets analysis is a decision technique devised specifically for situations
where it is not possible to quantify the risk. Regrets analysis focuses instead
on what we do know. We know a lot about the specific threats that we have
defined and about the level and criticality of damage that is possible. We
know the costs of alternative actions we can take to reduce the risk of such
threats materializing. We know something about the comparative
effectiveness of alternative actions in reducing risks or mitigating effects. Looking across all combinations of costs and scenarios,
regrets analysis determines which choice has the least chance of being the
worst choice over all possibilities. In other words, it shows how you can
minimize your potential regrets. This paper presents an example of regrets analysis applied to a security
improvement decision regarding the protection of a chlorine tank from
possible sabotage. The analysis is developed in a spreadsheet and the
following narrative describes the input data required and the analytical steps
involved. Includes tables.
| Edition : | Vol. - No. |
| File Size : | 1
file
, 200 KB |
| Note : | This product is unavailable in Ukraine, Russia, Belarus |
| Number of Pages : | 11 |
| Published : | 06/17/2004 |
