Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the United States there has been a renewed
interest by various organizations to evaluate appropriate security measures to prepare for additional acts of
terrorism. Acts of terrorism directed at drinking water have been reported previously. In response to these
attacks the water industry has been encouraged to develop vulnerability assessment plans. In general, these
plans focus on evaluating points of system vulnerability to terrorist attack via destruction of facilities or via
introduction of contaminants into the system. While many water agencies have existing plans to address
emergency response to catastrophic events (e.g., floods, earthquakes, tornadoes, etc.), they typically do not
focus on terrorist events involving intentional contamination with chemical, biological or radiological
agents. Consequently, many utilities require external assistance from organizations with experience in
developing security plans. Generally, these agencies have expertise in measures to protect against
destruction of facilities but frequently lack expertise to address chemical, biological, or radiological agents.
Indeed, this type of expertise is typically limited to the military or select government organizations.
However, current events have necessitated dissemination of this information, but due to the classified
nature of this issue it is extremely difficult for water agencies to acquire information on contaminants of
concern. Furthermore, methods to detect chemical and biological agents in drinking water is limited or
may not currently exist for some of the contaminants of concern. Consequently, development of effective
monitoring and analytical strategies to complement vulnerability assessment plans is challenging.
However, water utilities with laboratory facilities can implement effective intervention strategies but must
address a number of critical issues. The objective of this paper is to discuss key issues
including:
what external agencies are available to provide technical and analytical assistance to the water
industry;
do these agencies comprehend analytical challenges associated with sampling from source or
finished water sites;
what is the appropriate balance between external analytical assistance and that currently available
by water industry laboratories;
should analytical capabilities of water industry laboratories be expanded to address contaminants
of concern;
what issues must be addressed when developing monitoring and sample collection strategies; and,
what are the training and facilities requirements associated with monitoring for contaminants of
concern?
The paper also discusses the development of decision trees that allow an integrated
response to contamination threat events between water utilities, security agencies, public health laboratories
and government agencies.
Includes extended abstract only.
| Edition : | Vol. - No. |
| File Size : | 1
file
, 170 KB |
| Note : | This product is unavailable in Ukraine, Russia, Belarus |
| Number of Pages : | 1 |
| Published : | 11/01/2002 |
