NATO AASTP-4 PT 1 PDF

Introduction

Managing the inherent risk of handling and storing ammunition and explosives requires the development of policies, methodologies, and rules to provide safety. There exist in NATO two fundamentally different methods to accomplish this purpose: Quantity Distance (QD) methods and risk-based methods. Whereas QD methods apply a longstanding approach considering mainly the quantity of explosives and distance, risk-based methods consider a much more complete set of factors influencing risk including numerical assessments of the probability of event, effects, consequences, and personnel exposure. Thus the risk-based approach provides much deeper understanding of the risk and its causal factors to aide in decision making and in risk reduction. In situations where safety of surrounding personnel is of high visibility and importance, the use of risk-based techniques is advisable because it provides the best available understanding of risks and supports the “informed decision” principle in liability protection.

AASTP-4 is in two parts. Part I is an overview designed for use by policy makers, safety professionals, and analysts. Part II is designed for the risk analyst and contains detailed algorithms for coordinating risk assessments.

Purpose

AASTP-4 supports the continued growth and utilization of risk-based methods. It is designed to assist in developing and using new applications and to provide examples of current international uses. Toward these purposes, it:

• Advocates the broader application of risk-based methods,

• Provides guidance in the establishment of risk-based decision methods,

• Describes existing risk-based methods in use by the participating nations,

• Identifies common features of risk-based approaches, so that assessments done by individual nations in multinational operations may be understood and, if appropriate, used by other countries.

AASTP-4 is also intended to facilitate risk management and decision making on the safety of explosives and munitions activities especially those involving joint operations. Such as:

• To quantify the risk of situations that do not meet quantity-distance (Q-D) criteria,

• To identify potential improvements in existing risk-based methods,

• To establish means of exchanging results using different national models,

• To contribute to solutions for operational problems (e.g., field storage),

• To compare situations where QD and risk-based methods lead to different decisions,

• To assess the benefit of different risk reduction options,

• To support risk assessments needed to develop insensitive munitions.