NATO AJP-01(D) PDF

PREFACE

1. The successful planning, execution and support of military operations requires a clearly understood and widely accepted doctrine, and this is especially important when operations are to be conducted by Allied, multinational or coalition forces. The primary objective of Allied Joint Publication-01(C) (AJP-01(C)) ‘Allied Joint Doctrine' is to provide ‘capstone' doctrine for the planning, execution and support of Allied joint operations. Although AJP-01(C) is intended primarily for use by NATO forces, the doctrine is instructive to, and provides a useful framework for, operations conducted by a coalition of NATO, Partners, non-NATO nations and other organisations.

2. This edition reflects the changes to the Alliance following the Prague (Nov 2002) and Istanbul (Jun 2004) summits, the implementation of new NATO command structures and the NATO Reaction Force concept, the impact of transformation on Alliance military capabilities and nascent thinking on an effects-based approach to operations. The revision also acknowledges the population of subordinate levels of the Allied joint doctrine hierarchy, resulting in the removal of chapters covering the functional warfare and support areas.

3. AJP-01(C) is intended for use primarily by commanders and staffs at the operational level, but could be used at any level as a reference. It explains the principles that underpin the planning and conduct of Alliance campaigns and operations by giving commanders the strategic context for such operations, identifying the challenges to commanders and their staffs at the operational level and providing the commander in particular with tools and strategies to direct successful campaigns.

4. It is not the intention that AJP-01(C) should restrict the authority of a Joint Force Commander. Subject to the constraints and restraints imposed by the directives issued by higher authority, he will be expected to organize the forces assigned to him and to plan and execute operations in a manner he deems appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of his mission.

5. If it is to be useful, AJP-01(C) has to be a living document and be amended accordingly. Therefore, the Allied Joint Operations Doctrine Working Group (AJODWG) will review the contents on a 3-yearly cycle, unless changes in NATO policy require urgent amendment to published doctrine. As a capstone document requiring consensus between all Alliance member nations, the AJODWG is determined to restrict future amendment to the minimum. As a result, the reader will find AJP-01(C) more generic and abstract in nature than its predecessor, focusing on the underlying philosophy and fundamentals of joint operations at the operational level while referring to subordinate publications, in particular AJP-3(A) ‘Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Operations' and AJP-5 ‘Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational Planning'.

Key themes of this approach are:

a. A Single Doctrine for Operations. The Alliance has a single doctrine for operations: there is no difference in doctrine at the level of philosophy and principles due to differing mandates or types of operation. Such differences may become evident at the lower doctrinal levels of practices and procedures, but these are below the level of this publication. AJP-01(C) provides a framework of understanding for the approach to all Allied operations; after this Preface no distinction is made between types of operation unless important.

b. The Deployed Nature of Operations. Deployed operations occur both within and outside the NATO area. From an individual member nation's perspective, a deployment to the periphery of NATO is no different to a deployment outside; the fact remains that its forces are deployed and require logistic support and therefore the ability of its forces to deploy, ‘deployability', is an important characteristic. It is rare that a member nation does not have to deploy its forces to some extent in support of a NATO operation, and the expeditionary nature of NATO operations is likely to increase.

c. The Operational Environment is Complex. All military planning must be coherent with other non-military and potentially multinational and non-governmental initiatives intended to stabilise and create a self-sustaining secure environment. A NATO military response must therefore be integrated into a wider overall framework or a collective strategy. In taking these and other security factors into account there is no fundamental difference in the planning and execution of any operation across the full range of NATO's military capabilities.

d. ‘Operations are Operations'. All operations can fundamentally be approached in the same manner because NATO forces must expect to perform a wide range of potentially simultaneous activities across a spectrum of conflict, from combat action to humanitarian aid, within short timeframes and in close proximity. What will vary will be the mandates, constraints and drivers that will be factors in the commander's mission analysis; campaign plan development, selection and execution; and the force generation process where members can elect to participate in a Non-Article 5 operation.